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Abstract
We study the regulation of a manager-controlled monopoly with unknown costs, borrowing
from the earlier work of Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982), where the monopoly is controlled
by the owner. Our regulatory environment involves the case where the regulator can tax
the owner as well as the case where she cannot. We show that the optimal price schedule
in our model generally lies below the one in the BM model. In addition, if the compensa-
tion parameter is sufficiently small, the optimal price can be as low as the marginal cost,
provided that the regulator cannot tax the owner of the monopoly. We also examine how
the size of the managerial compensation affects the welfare of the owner of the monopoly
as well as the social welfare. Moreover, we show that in settings where the owner of a
manager-controlled monopoly cannot be taxed, the owner prefers to separate management
from ownership, provided that the marginal cost of production is sufficiently large. How-
ever, the owner always prefers to manage the monopoly herself when the marginal cost of
production is sufficiently small.
Keywords: Monopoly; Regulation; Firm Ownership; Firm Control
JEL Classification Numbers: D82; L51
∗ E-mail address: isaglam@ipek.edu.tr.
1
1 Introduction
A great body of the economics of regulation has dealt with models involving mo-
nopolistic or oligopolistic firms that are managed by their owners. In many of these
models where the regulated firm is assumed to possess private information about
cost, demand or effort, regulatory solutions have been proposed as a direct revela-
tion mechanism (see, for example, Baron and Myerson (1982), Baron and Besanko
(1984), Laffont and Tirole (1986), Prusa (1990), and Strausz (2011)). A direct rev-
elation mechanism requires the regulated firm to report its private information and
it ensures truthful revelation if the regulated firm is provided with sufficiently high
incentives. As the owner of a regulated firm maximizes her profits, the incentives
offered by a typical regulatory mechanism in the existing literature accordingly takes
into account the effect of the owner’s potential lies on her profits. However in real
life, the ownership and management are separated for many firms, and the objective
function of such firms are either revenues, market shares or a fraction of the profits
rather than the whole profits.1 Thus, the incentives of a manager-controlled firm to
misrepresent its private information under a direct revelation mechanism may differ
from those of an owner-controlled firm, calling for the need of extending the existing
theories on monopoly regulation. To this end, our paper examines the implication of
separating management from ownership in an incentive model of monopoly regula-
tion. The model we construct borrows from the seminal work of Baron and Myerson
(BM) (1982), who characterized an optimal direct-revelation mechanism regulating
an owner-managed monopoly with unknown marginal costs.
The model of BM is the first in the whole economics of regulation to define
a general social welfare function, defined as the sum of consumers’ welfare and a
fraction of the monopolist’s welfare.2 The regulatory mechanism proposed by BM
1See Williamson (1963) and Sklivas (1987) for a discussion on the validity of profit maximization
hypothesis.
2For a particular definition of social welfare function that treats the welfares of consumers
and the monopoly equally, a solution to the problem of regulating a monopoly under asymmetric
information was earlier provided by Loeb and Magat (1979). Their solution delegates the output
decision to the monopoly, which is also offered the right to the whole social surplus. Thus, the
monopoly chooses to produce at the socially efficient level. While this delegatory incentive scheme
is not a direct-revelation mechanism, its outcome is essentially the same as the one obtained in the
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involves four policy functions: a price function and a quantity function which are
consistent with the market demand curve, a probability function that specifies at
each cost level whether the monopoly will be permitted to operate, and a subsidy
function that specifies a money transfer from consumers to the monopoly at each
cost level. The construction of the mechanism ensures that the monopoly truthfully
reveals the private cost parameter. In fact, this is made possible by guaranteeing
to the monopoly an information rent which is maximized only under truthful rev-
elation. Formally, this incentive-compatible rent has to be equal to the area under
a (downward-sloping) adjusted demand curve over the range of possible marginal
costs not lower than the actual marginal cost of the monopoly. Because this rent is
generated through a subsidy from consumers to the monopoly, the consumers and
the whole society can be expected to become better off when it is lower, provided
that the welfare of the monopoly has a lower weight than the welfare of consumers
in the definition of social welfare. Absolutely, to reduce the information rent one
needs to reduce the marginal information rent, equalling the quantity of output, at
each possible cost level. However, the problem of limiting the output schedule is not
trivial, since a contraction of this schedule would suppress not only the information
rent but also the gross social surplus net of the total cost of production. Conse-
quently, any change in the output schedule would always create a tradeoff since the
(expected) social welfare under regulation turns to be (the expected value of) the
weighted difference between ‘the gross social surplus net of the total cost of produc-
tion’ and ‘the information rent’ received by the monopoly. Indeed, this tradeoff is
right balanced by the optimal output policy proposed by BM.
We extend the described regulation model of BM by separating ownership from
management; i.e. in our model the monopoly is controlled by a separate manager.
As we will assume that the marginal cost information is privately known to the
manager, the regulator will elicit the private cost information from the manager
instead of the owner of the monopoly. Clearly, the regulator can be expected to use
the cost information, once he has extracted it from the manager, to also regulate
the earnings of the owner through an optimal tax. In reality, however, this may not
BM model under the described egalitarian form of social welfare function. However, this scheme is
obviously not efficient under other forms of social welfare function.
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always be true. The reason is that many firms are widely held corporations, where
the owner may involve hundreds or thousands of shareholders, and because of some
political concerns, the regulator may be unwilling to directly or indirectly tax a huge
number of shareholders. To account for this situation, we will allow in our model the
case where the regulator cannot tax the owner of the manager-controlled monopoly,
as well as the case where she can.
We will also assume that the manager receives a positive fraction of the profits of
the monopoly as a salary while the rest of the profits accrues to the owner. Obviously,
in the absence of any regulation the separation of ownership from management would
be inconsequential for the market outcome since our managerial objective function
is perfectly aligned with the welfare of the owner. However, under regulation the
separation will matter despite the assumed form of managerial objectives. The reason
is that the incentive to misrepresent the marginal cost will be lower for the manager
in our model (where his unregulated salary is a fraction of the profits) than the
owner in the BM model (where the whole of the profits constitutes her unregulated
gain). Accordingly, the information rent the manager should obtain to truthfully
reveal his private cost information can be predicted to be lower than the information
rent the owner of the monopoly would receive in the BM model. So, the necessity of
suppressing the output schedule to reduce the welfare loss caused by the rent of the
private information seems to become less stringent in the case of a manager-controlled
monopoly than in the case of an owner-controlled monopoly. Indeed, because of the
presence of managerial compensations, the optimal price (output) schedule in our
model will always lie below (above) the one in the BM model. Moreover, if the
compensation parameter is sufficiently small, the optimal price in our model can be
as low as the marginal cost, provided that the regulator cannot tax the owner of the
monopoly.
We will also show that irrespective of whether the owner of the monopoly knows
the marginal cost of production, it can never be optimal for the owner to choose
the size of the managerial compensation (as a fraction of the profits) arbitrarily
small or arbitrarily large. In addition, when the regulator can tax the owner of
the monopoly, the expected social welfare becomes decreasing in the size of the
managerial compensation. However, when the regulator cannot tax the owner of the
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monopoly, the expected social welfare becomes increasing over a range of managerial
compensations that are sufficiently small.
A second question we attempt to answer in this paper is whether the owner prefers
a manager-controlled monopoly to an owner-controlled monopoly in situations where
she knows the marginal cost of production. Our results show that this is indeed the
case if the marginal cost is sufficiently large and if the regulator cannot tax the owner
of a manager-controlled company. On the other hand, the owner prefers to manage
the monopoly herself if the marginal cost of production is sufficiently small.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our model,
containing basic structures for a manager-controlled monopoly and the problem faced
by the regulator. Section 3 contains results for this model, involving the optimal
regulatory policy and some welfare analyses. Section 4 studies whether separating
management from ownership can be desirable for the owner of a regulated monopoly.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model builds upon the earlier work of Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982). We
consider an environment where the operations of a monopoly with private cost in-
formation are regulated. However, unlike in the BM model we assume that the
monopoly is a manager-controlled firm. Thus, our model involves three agents: the
regulator (she), the owner of the monopoly (she) and the manager (he).
The manager faces a negatively sloped inverse demand function
P (q) = a− q, for all q ≥ 0, (1)
where q denotes the quantity of output and a is a positive real. The manager also
faces a cost function
C(q, θ) = θq, for all q ≥ 0, (2)
where θ denotes the marginal cost. We assume that θ ∈ [θ0, θ1] with a > θ1 > θ0 > 0.
For simplicity, we set the fixed cost of production to zero. The inverse demand
function and the form of the cost function are known to the manager and the owner
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of the monopoly as well as to the regulator. On the other hand, the marginal cost
parameter θ is privately known to the manager. However, the owner of the monopoly
and the regulator have a prior belief about θ, represented by the density function f ,
which is positive and continuous over its support [θ0, θ1]. Let F denote the cumulative
distribution function associated with f . We assume that both the belief f and its
support [θ0, θ1] are known to all three agents.
Given the described environment, the total value to consumers of an output of
quantity q is V (q) =
∫ q
0
P (x)dx, and the consumer surplus is V (q) − P (q)q. On
the other hand, the (operating) profits of the monopoly are P (q)q − C(q, θ). We
assume that the manager of the monopoly is entitled to a fraction of the profits, i.e.,
k [P (q)q − C(q, θ)], where k ∈ [0, 1] is determined by the owner. Accordingly, the
rest of the profits, i.e., (1− k)[P (q)q−C(q, θ)], accrues to the owner. For simplicity,
we assume that the manager does not earn any fixed salary.
To find the optimal regulatory mechanism, we restrict ourselves by the Revelation
Principle [Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979), Myerson (1979), and Harris and
Townsend (1981)] to direct mechanisms that require the manager of the monopoly
to report his private cost parameter and that gives him no incentive to lie. Ex-
tending the direct mechanism of BM (1982), we consider a mechanism involving the
outcome functions 〈r, p, q, sm, so〉. For any cost report θˆ of the manager, p(θˆ) and
q(θˆ) are the regulated price and quantity respectively, r(θˆ) is the probability that
the monopoly will be permitted to operate, sm(θˆ) and so(θˆ) are the expected values
of the subsidies the manager and the owner will receive conditional on the probabil-
ity that the monopoly is permitted to operate. Here, we should note that in some
manager-controlled monopolies, the owner may consist of many public shareholders,
and because of some political concerns the regulatory agency may be unwilling to
tax shareholders of the regulated monopoly. To account for such cases, our model
will involve a binary valued parameter γ, which will take the value of 1 if the reg-
ulator can tax the owner and will take the value of 0 otherwise. The value of γ is
exogenously given to each of the three agents in the regulatory environment.
We also assume that both the manager and the owner of the monopoly are risk
neutral. If the manager reports the marginal cost parameter as θˆ when it is actually
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θ, his compensation (or salary) Sm(θˆ, θ) becomes
Sm(θˆ, θ) = k
[
p(θˆ)q(θˆ)− θq(θˆ)
]
r(θˆ) + sm(θˆ), (3)
whereas the net earnings of the owner becomes
pio(θˆ, θ) = (1− k)
[
p(θˆ)q(θˆ)− θq(θˆ)
]
r(θˆ) + γso(θˆ). (4)
A regulatory policy 〈r, p, q, sm, so〉 is called feasible if it satisfies the following
conditions for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]:
(i) r(θ) satisfies
0 ≤ r(θ) ≤ 1, (5)
(ii) p(θ) and q(θ) are consistent with the inverse demand curve, i.e.,
p(θ) = P (q(θ)), (6)
(iii) the regulatory policy is individually rational for both the manager and the owner
of the monopoly under the truthful revelation of the manager, i.e.,
Sm(θ) ≡ Sm(θ, θ) ≥ 0, (7)
pio(θ) ≡ pio(θ, θ) ≥ 0. (8)
(iv) the regulatory policy is incentive-compatible for the manager, i.e.,
Sm(θ, θ) ≥ Sm(θˆ, θ), for all θˆ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. (9)
The aim of the regulator is to find a regulatory policy that satisfies the above
feasibility conditions and that is optimal from the viewpoint of the society (or the
regulator benevolently acting on behalf of it). Below, we will formally define the
regulator’s objective. Let θ ∈ [θ0, θ1] be the private cost information of the manager.
Given a feasible regulatory policy 〈r, p, q, sm, so〉, the manager will truthfully report θ,
and the consumer welfare (consumer surplus net of the subsidies paid to the manager
and the owner of the monopoly) will be given by
WC(θ) = [V (q(θ))− p(θ)q(θ)] r(θ)− sm(θ)− γso(θ). (10)
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The social welfare W S(θ) is then defined to be the sum of the consumer welfare
WC(θ) plus a fraction (α ∈ [0, 1]) of the sum of the welfares of the manager and the
owner of the monopoly, α[Sm(θ) + pio(θ)]. Formally,
W S(θ) = WC(θ) + α [Sm(θ) + pio(θ)]
= [V (q(θ))− (1− α)(1− k)p(θ)q(θ)− (α + k(1− α)) θq(θ)] r(θ)
−(1− α)Sm(θ)− (1− α)γso(θ). (11)
The objective of the regulator is to choose a feasible regulatory policy that maximizes
the expected value of W S(θ), conditional on the prior beliefs f(θ). Formally, the
regulator’s problem is
max
r,p,q,sm,so
∫ θ1
0
W S(θ)f(θ)dθ subject to (5)− (9). (12)
3 Results
Below, we will first characterize the optimal regulatory policy, or the solution to the
problem in (12). The following assumptions will be helpful for our results.
Assumption 1. F (θ)/f(θ) is nondecreasing in θ ∈ [θ0, θ1].
Assumption 2. k(1− α)F (θ1)/f(θ1) < [1− (1− α)(1− k)(1− γ)](a− θ1).
The first assumption, which is standard in the mechanism design literature, will
ensure that the marginal informational rent function will be nonincreasing at the
optimal solution.3 On the other hand, the second assumption will ensure that the
optimal output will be positive at the least efficient production technology. Given
Assumption 1, if the inequality in Assumption 2 holds for θ1, it will also be true for
all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. So, Assumptions 1 and 2 together will guarantee that the optimal
output will always be positive.
3We will use Assumption 1 to simplify the derivation of the optimal regulatory policy. BM
(1982) characterizes the optimal policy for the case of k = 1 without appealing to Assumption 1.
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Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and let (1−α)(1− k)(1− γ) < 1/2.
Then, the solution to the regulator’s problem in (12) is given by the optimal policy
〈r¯, p¯, q¯, s¯m, s¯o〉 satisfying equations (13)-(20) for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]:
p¯(θ) = max{θ, z¯(θ)} (13)
z¯(θ) =
(1−M)θ+k(1− α)F (θ)
f(θ)
−Ma
1− 2M (14)
M = (1− α)(1− k)(1− γ) (15)
p¯(θ) = P (q¯(θ)) (16)
r¯(θ) =
{
1 if Γ¯(θ) ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
(17)
Γ¯(θ) = V (q¯(θ))−Mp¯(θ)q¯(θ)− [(1− 2M)z¯(θ) +Ma]q¯(θ) (18)
s¯m(θ) = k [θq¯(θ)− p¯(θ)q¯(θ)] r¯(θ) + k
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(x)q¯(x)dx (19)
s¯o(θ) = (1− k) [θq¯(θ)− p¯(θ)q¯(θ)] r¯(θ) (20)
Proof. We will mimic the proof of the main theorem in Baron and Myerson (1982).
The incentive compatibility condition (9) requires that r(θ)q(θ) is nonincreasing, and
also that Sm(θ) ≡ Sm(θ, θ) = maxθˆ∈[θ0,θ1] S(θˆ, θ), implying S ′m(θ) = −kq(θ)r(θ) by
the envelope function theorem. Thus,
Sm(θ) = Sm(θ1) + k
∫ θ1
θ
r(x)q(x)dx. (21)
Using integration by parts, we can then calculate∫ θ1
θ0
Sm(θ)f(θ)dθ = Sm(θ1) + k
∫ θ1
θ0
r(θ)q(θ)F (θ)dθ. (22)
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On the other hand, from equation (11) and the constraint (8) it follows that the
expected social welfare is maximized only if
so(θ) = (1− k)[θq(θ)− p(θ)q(θ)]r(θ), (23)
implying pio(θ) = 0 if γ = 1 and pio(θ) = (1 − k)[p(θ)q(θ) − θq(θ)]r(θ) if γ = 0.
Inserting (22) and (23) into
∫ θ1
θ0
W S(θ)f(θ)dθ yields∫ θ1
θ0
[(
V (q(θ))− (1− α)(1− k)(1− γ)p(θ)q(θ)
−
(
α + (1− α)(k + (1− k)γ)
)
θq(θ)
)
− k(1− α)F (θ)
f(θ)
q(θ)
]
r(θ)f(θ)dθ
−(1− α)Sm(θ1). (24)
Maximizing the expected social welfare in (24) requires maximizing the integrand
for all θ. The first-order condition for the unconstrained optimum would yield
p¯(θ) = z¯(θ), with z¯(θ) satisfying (14), given (15). However, the individual ratio-
nality condition (8) also requires p¯(θ) ≥ θ. Since z¯(θ) ≥ θ may not always hold when
k < 1, we must have p¯(θ) = max{θ, z¯(θ)}, implying (13). Equation (16) follows from
(6). Under the individual rationality condition (7), maximizing the integral (24) also
implies that Sm(θ1) = 0. (In fact, for α = 1, any nonnegative value of Sm(θ1) can be
optimal; however, for simplicity we set it to zero.) Using the optimal functions p¯(.)
and q¯(.) that are given by (13)-(16) and also the optimality condition Sm(θ1) = 0,
the expected social welfare in (24) can be rewritten as∫ θ1
θ0
[
V (q¯(θ))−Mp¯(θ)q¯(θ)− [(1− 2M)z¯(θ) +Ma]q¯(θ)
]
r(θ)f(θ). (25)
The probability r(θ) must be equal to one if the expression inside the large brackets
in the above equation is nonnegative and zero otherwise, implying r¯(θ) as given by
(17) and (18). It is easy to check that z¯(θ) is increasing, p¯(θ) is nondecreasing, and
q¯(θ) is nonincreasing, in θ, thanks to Assumption 1. Note also that if p¯(θ) = θ, then
it is easy to check in (18) that
Γ¯(θ) = (1− 2M)
(
a2 − θ2
2
− z¯(θ)
)
, (26)
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implying
Γ¯′(θ) = (1− 2M) [−θ − z¯′(θ)] < 0, (27)
since z¯′(θ) > 0. On the other hand, if p¯(θ) = z¯(θ), then
Γ¯(θ) =
a2 − z¯2(θ)
2
− [(1−M)z¯(θ) +Ma](a− z¯(θ)), (28)
implying
Γ¯′(θ) = −(1− 2M)(a− z¯(θ))z¯′(θ) < 0, (29)
since a − z¯(θ) > 0 by Assumptions 1 and 2 and also z¯′(θ) > 0 by As-
sumption 1. Therefore, r¯(θ) is always nonincreasing. Equation (19) fol-
lows from the fact that the manager’s regulated salary S¯m(θ) is equal to
k
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(x)q¯(x)dx = k [p¯(θ)q¯(θ)− C(q¯(θ), θ)] r¯(θ) + s¯m(θ). On the other hand, (20)
follows from (23) calculated at the optimal policy functions p¯(θ), q¯(θ), and r¯(θ).
Finally note that, (13)-(20) satisfy the feasibility conditions (5)-(9). 
Corollary 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and k = 1, i.e., the whole of the profits
are received by the manager. Then, the optimal levels of price, output, information
rent, and the social welfare implied by (13)-(20) at each cost level become identical
to those in the BM model (1982), where the monopoly is managed by its owner.
When α = 1, the optimal policy in (13)-(20) would reduce to p¯(θ) = z¯(θ) =
θ, q¯(θ) = a − θ, r¯(θ) = 1, s¯m(θ) = k
∫ θ1
θ
q¯(x)dx, and s¯o(θ) = 0. As the optimal
price and output policies obtained under α = 1 are independent of k, we will restrict
ourselves in the rest of this paper to the more interesting case of α < 1.
We also observe from (15) that when owner of a manager-controlled monopoly
can taxed by the regulator (γ = 1), the parameter M = (1− α)(1− k)(1− γ) would
become zero, and the assumption M < 1/2 in Proposition 1 would hold for all k
and α. Hence, we can claim the following.
Corollary 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, γ = 1, and α ∈ [0, 1). Then, for all
θ ∈ [θ0, θ1], we have
p¯(θ) = z¯(θ) = θ + k(1− α)F (θ)/f(θ), (30)
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implying that p¯(θ) is increasing and q¯(θ) is decreasing in k for all θ ∈ (θ0, θ1].
Moreover, r¯(θ) = 1 for all k ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [θ0, θ1].
Proof. By the stated assumptions, the optimal policy is given by (13)-(20). Let
γ = 1. Then, M = 0 from (15). Pick any θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. Inserting M = 0 into (14)
yields z¯(θ) = θ+ k(1− α)F (θ)/f(θ). Clearly, z¯(θ) ≥ θ, implying p¯(θ) = z¯(θ). More-
over, p¯(θ) is increasing and q¯(θ) is decreasing in k if θ > θ0. Finally, using M = 0
and p¯(θ) = z¯(θ), we obtain Γ¯(θ) = [a−z¯(θ)]2/2 > 0. Then, (17) implies r¯(θ) = 1. 
The above result implies that in regulatory environments where legal settings
allow the regulator to tax the owner of the monopoly, the optimal price (output) in
our model is lower (higher) than the optimal price (output) in the BM model, as
long as k < 1. Below, we examine the effect of k of the optimal regulatory policy
when the owner of the monopoly cannot be taxed.
Corollary 3. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, γ = 0, and α ∈ (1/2, 1). Then, z¯(θ)
is increasing, p¯(θ) is nondecreasing, and q¯(θ) is nonincreasing in k for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1].
Proof. Since γ = 0 and α > 1/2, we have M = (1− α)(1− k) < 1/2. Therefore all
of the assumptions of Proposition 1 are satisfied thanks to the stated assumptions of
the corollary, implying that the optimal policy is given by (13)-(20). Now, pick any
θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. Differentiating (14) with respect to k yields
z¯k(θ) =
(1− α)
(
a− θ + (2α− 1)F (θ)
f(θ)
)
(
1− 2M
)2 . (31)
Clearly, z¯k(θ) > 0 since a > θ1 ≥ θ and α > 1/2 by assumption. Then, from (13) it
follows that p¯(θ) is nondecreasing in k, and from (1) and (16) it follows that q¯(θ) is
nonincreasing in k. 
Corollary 3 implies that the regulated price (output) of the manager-controlled
monopoly is never above (below) that of the owner-controlled monopoly in the BM
model, where k = 1. It is of interest to also see whether the optimal price given
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by (13) can always be equal to the marginal cost of production. Calculating the
difference
z¯(θ)− θ =
M(θ − a) + k(1− α)F (θ)
f(θ
1− 2M , (32)
we observe that the denominator of the ratio on the right hand side is positive when
α ∈ (1/2, 1). On the other hand, in the nominator the first term is always nonpositive
since θ ≤ θ1 < a by assumption, while the second term is always nonnegative. So,
the sign of z¯(θ) − θ is in general ambiguous, depending on the parameters in the
above equation. However, given the other parameters, the parameter k may help us
to predict the sign of z¯(θ)− θ as will be shown.
Let us denote by k∗(θ) the level of k that solves z¯(θ)− θ = 0. Equating the right
hand side of (32) to zero, we can solve for
k∗(θ) =

(a−θ)
(a−θ)+F (θ)
f(θ)
if γ = 0,
0 if γ = 1.
(33)
This leads us to the following result.
Corollary 4. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and α ∈ (1/2, 1). Then, for all
θ ∈ [θ0, θ1], the optimal price satisfies
p¯(θ) =
{
θ if k ∈ [0, k∗(θ)],
z¯(θ) if k ∈ (k∗(θ), 1]. (34)
Proof. By the stated assumptions, the optimal policy is given by (13)-(20). Equation
(32) implies that
z¯(θ0)− θ0 = M(θ0 − a)
1− 2M ≤ 0. (35)
So, p¯(θ0) = θ0 for all k ∈ [0, 1], implying that p¯(θ0) satisfies (34) for k∗(θ0) = 1.
Now, pick any θ ∈ (θ0, θ1]. Since k∗(θ) in (33) solves z¯(θ) = θ, to show that
the optimal price at θ satisfies (34), it will be sufficient to prove that z¯k(θ) > 0.
Note that if γ = 1, then M = 0 and z¯(θ) = θ + k(1 − α)F (θ)/f(θ), implying
13
z¯k(θ) = (1− α)F (θ)/f(θ) > 0. On the other hand, if γ = 0, then z¯k(θ) > 0 by (31).

Equation (33) suggests that when γ = 0, we have 0 < k∗(θ) < 1 for all θ > θ0.
Thus, the optimal regulatory policy, as illustrated in Figure 1, recommends marginal
cost pricing if the parameter k is sufficiently small and recommends a positive markup
if the parameter k is sufficiently large. Moreover, we observe that when γ = 0, the
breaking point k∗(θ) is decreasing in θ due to Assumption 1.
p(θ1)
θ1
̶
k*(θ)k*(θ1) k*(θ0)=1
p(θ)
̶
p(θ0)
θ
θ0
0 k
̶
Figure 1. Optimal Regulatory Price as a Function of k
We will now examine how the welfares of different parties in the society change
with respect to the parameter k. Given the optimal regulatory policy (13)-(20), let
p¯io(θ) and S¯m(θ) denote the regulated net earnings of the owner of the monopoly and
the regulated salary of the manager respectively, and letW
S
(θ) denote the regulated
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social welfare. When γ = 1, all the earnings of the owner of the monopoly is taxed
by the regulator so that p¯io(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. In that case, k has no effect
on p¯io(.). On the other hand, when the regulator is not allowed to tax the owner
of the monopoly, i.e., γ = 0, we have p¯io(θ) = (1 − k)[p¯(θ)q¯(θ) − θq¯(θ)]r¯(θ) and
differentiating it with respect to k yields
∂p¯io(θ)
∂k
= −[p¯(θ)q¯(θ)− θq¯(θ)]r¯(θ) + (1− k)[p¯(θ)q¯(θ)− θq¯(θ)]r¯k(θ)
+(1− k)[p¯k(θ)q¯(θ) + (p¯(θ)− θ)q¯k(θ)]r¯(θ). (36)
In the above equation, the first term on the right hand side, the direct effect
of k, is nonpositive, whereas the sign of the second and third terms, constituting
indirect effects, are ambiguous. Therefore, the net effect of k on p¯io(θ) is in general
indeterminate. However, we are still able to show below that the optimal value of k
for the monopoly owner cannot be zero, i.e., the full ownership of profits can never
be optimal for the owner of the regulated monopoly when γ = 0. (Hereafter, for any
function x(.) in our model and for any θ ∈ [θ0, θ1] and any k′ ∈ [0, 1], x(θ|k = k′)
will denote the value of x at θ when k = k′.)
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, γ = 0, and α ∈ (1/2, 1). Pick any
θ ∈ (θ0, θ1]. If kˆ(θ) = argmaxk∈[0,1] p¯io(θ), then kˆ(θ) ∈ (0, 1), p¯(θ|k = kˆ(θ)) > θ,
and r¯(θ|k = kˆ(θ)) = 1.
Proof. By the assumptions stated above, the optimal regulatory policy is given
by (13)-(20). Pick any θ ∈ (θ0, θ1]. Note that p¯io(θ) = (1− k)[p¯(θ)q¯(θ)− θq¯(θ)]r¯(θ).
Equations (14) − (15) imply that z¯(θ|k = 0) − θ = M(θ − a)/(1 − 2M) ≤ 0. So,
p¯(θ|k = 0) = θ, implying p¯io(θ|k = 0) = 0. It is also clear that p¯io(θ|k = 1) = 0.
We also have p¯(θ|k = 1) = θ + (1 − α)F (θ)/f(θ) > θ, and r¯(θ|k = 1) = 1 since
Γ¯(θ) = (a − z¯(θ))2/2 ≥ 0. Since p¯(θ) and r¯(θ) are continuous in k, there exists
k′ ∈ (0, 1) such that p¯(θ|k = k′) > θ and r¯(θ|k = k′) = 1, implying p¯io(θ|k = k′) > 0.
Thus, if kˆ(θ) = argmaxk∈[0,1] p¯io(θ), then kˆ(θ) ∈ (0, 1), p¯(θ|k = kˆ(θ)) > θ, and
r¯(θ|k = kˆ(θ)) = 1. 
The above proposition will be helpful in Section 4, where the owner of the
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monopoly will be assumed to know the marginal cost of production and will choose
the compensation parameter that maximizes her own net gains. On the other hand,
in this section, the marginal cost information is unknown to the monopoly owner.
Therefore, the compensation parameter chosen by the monopoly owner when γ = 0
should maximize the expected value of her net gains.
Proposition 3. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, γ = 0, and α ∈ (1/2, 1). If
kˆ = argmaxk∈[0,1]
∫ θ1
θ0
p¯io(θ)f(θ)dθ, then kˆ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. By the assumptions stated above, the optimal regulatory policy is given
by (13)-(20). Note that
∫ θ1
θ0
p¯io(θ)f(θ)dθ = (1 − k)
∫ θ1
θ0
[p¯(θ)q¯(θ) − θq¯(θ)]r¯(θ)f(θ)dθ.
Equations (14)− (15) imply that for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1] we have z¯(θ|k = 0)− θ = M(θ−
a)/(1 − 2M) ≤ 0, implying p¯(θ|k = 0) = θ. Therefore, ∫ θ1
θ0
p¯io(θ|k = 0)f(θ)dθ = 0.
On the other hand,
∫ θ1
θ0
p¯io(θ|k = 1)f(θ)dθ = 0, trivially. Now pick any θ ∈ (θ0, θ1].
We have M = 0 when k = 1, implying p¯(θ|k = 1) = θ + (1 − α)F (θ)/f(θ) > θ by
(13) and (14). Moreover, from (18) it follows that
Γ¯(θ|k = 1) = (a− z¯(θ))
2
2
≥ 0. (37)
So, r¯(θ|k = 1) = 1 by (17). Since p¯(θ) and r¯(θ) are continuous in k, there
exists k′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all θ ∈ (θ0, θ1] and for all k′′ ∈ (k′, 1), we have
p¯io(θ|k = k′′) > 0, implying
∫ θ1
θ0
p¯io(θ|k = k′′)f(θ)dθ > 0. Thus, we have established
that if kˆ = argmaxk∈[0,1]
∫ θ1
θ0
p¯io(θ)f(θ)dθ, then kˆ ∈ (0, 1). 
Proposition 3 shows that the optimal managerial compensation chosen by the
owner of the monopoly, when she does not know the marginal cost of production,
cannot be arbitrarily small or arbitrarily large if γ = 0. Now, in order to find the ef-
fect of k on the manager’s regulated salary, we differentiate S¯m(θ) = k
∫ θ1
θ
q¯(x)r¯(x)dx
with respect to k and obtain
∂S¯m(θ)
∂k
=
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(x)q¯(x)dx+ k
∫ θ1
θ
[r¯k(x)q¯(x) + r¯(x)q¯k(x)] dx. (38)
The first integral, accounting for the direct effect of k on S¯m(θ), is always nonnegative.
In fact, for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1] we have p¯(θ|k = 0) = θ and it is easy to check that
16
r¯(θ|k = 0) = 1, implying ∫ θ1
θ
q¯(x|k = 0)r¯(x|k = 0)dx > 0. Besides, the second
integral in (38) vanishes when k = 0, implying ∂S¯m(θ)/∂k|k=0 > 0. On the other
hand, the sign of the second integral in (38), which becomes relevant when k > 0,
is ambiguous. Overall, the net effect of k on S¯m(θ) is indeterminate when k > 0.
Although it is clear that the manager’s regulated salary S¯m attains its minimum (the
value of zero) when k = 0, it is not determinate whether or not the manager prefers
the full ownership of profits (k = 1) to the partial ownership (k < 1).
Since the manager’s salary S¯m(θ) explicitly enters into the definition of the
actual social welfare in (11), the effect of k on the actual social welfare is also
indeterminate. However, we below show that the manager’s compensation parameter
k has a negative impact on the expected social welfare if γ = 1.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, γ = 1, and α ∈ (1/2, 1). Then,∫ θ1
θ0
W
S
(θ)f(θ)dθ is decreasing in k ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. By the assumptions stated above, the optimal regulatory policy is given by
(13)-(20). Pick any θ ∈ (θ0, θ1]. Note that with γ = 1, we have M = 0, and equations
(13) and (14) would imply p¯(θ) = z¯(θ) = θ+k(1−α)F (θ)/f(θ) > θ. Moreover, from
(18) it follows that
Γ¯(θ) =
(a− z¯(θ))2
2
≥ 0. (39)
So, r¯(θ) = 1 by (17). Thus, the expected social welfare in (25) reduces to∫ θ1
θ0
W
S
(θ)f(θ)dθ =
∫ θ1
θ0
Γ¯(θ)f(θ)dθ. (40)
Note that
Γ¯k(θ) = −2[a− z¯(θ)]z¯k(θ) < 0 (41)
by Assumptions 1 and 2 and Corollary 2. Therefore,
∫ θ1
θ0
W
S
(θ)f(θ)dθ is decreasing
in k ∈ [0, 1]. 
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The above result directly reveals what the socially optimal size of the managerial
compensation is when γ = 1.
Corollary 5. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, γ = 1, and α ∈ (1/2, 1). Then, the
expected social welfare attains its maximum when all of the profits is received by the
owner of the monopoly (k = 0).
Below, we will investigate the effect of k on the expected social welfare when the
regulator cannot tax net earnings of the owner (γ = 0).
Assumption 3. F (θ1)/f(θ1) < (a+ θ1)(a− θ1 − 1).
Note that when f is the uniform distribution, we have F (θ)/f(θ) = θ− θ0 for all
θ ∈[θ0, θ1], and Assumption 3 is satisfied if and only if (θ1−θ0)+θ1(θ1+1) < a(a−1).
In fact, for any belief f it is always true to say that Assumption 3 would hold when
the demand parameter a is sufficiently high.
Proposition 5. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold, γ = 0, and α ∈ (1/2, 1).
Then
∫ θ1
θ0
W
S
(θ)f(θ)dθ is increasing in k over [0, k∗(θ1)) where k∗(θ1) =
(a− θ1)/[(a− θ1) + F (θ1)/f(θ1)].
Proof. By the assumptions stated above, the optimal regulatory policy is given
by (13)-(20). Note also from (25) that the expected social welfare is equal to∫ θ1
θ0
Γ¯(θ)r¯(θ)f(θ). Let k ∈ [0, k∗(θ1)) and γ = 0, and pick any θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. We must
have p¯(θ) = θ since by equation (33) we have k∗(θ) > k∗(θ1), thanks to Assumption
1. Therefore, from (18) we have
Γ¯(θ) = (1− 2M)
(
a2 − θ2
2
− z¯(θ)
)
. (42)
It follows that
Γ¯k(θ) = −(1− 2M)z¯k(θ) + (1− α)
(
a2 − θ2 − 2z¯(θ)) . (43)
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Inserting (31) into the above equation yields
Γ¯k(θ) = (1− α)
(
a2 − θ2 − a− θ − F (θ)
f(θ)
)
. (44)
We have Γ¯k(θ1) > 0 by Assumption 3. Moreover, Γ¯k θ(θ) < 0 by Assumption 1.
Therefore, it is true that Γ¯k(θ) > 0. So, the expected social welfare is increasing in
k over [0, k∗(θ1)). 
The effect of k on the expected social welfare is ambiguous over the interval
[k∗(θ1), 1]. However, the above result is sufficient to directly imply that when γ = 0,
the expected social welfare cannot be maximized by the choice of k = 0, unlike in
the case of γ = 1.
Corollary 6. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold, γ = 0, and α ∈ (1/2, 1). Then,
the expected social welfare attains its maximum for some k ∈ [k∗(θ1), 1], where
k∗(θ1) = (a− θ1)/[(a− θ1) + F (θ1)/f(θ1)] ∈ (0, 1).
Up to now, we have seen how the optimal regulatory policy and the induced
welfares in the regulatory environment are affected by the value of the managerial
compensation parameter k. Next, we will deal with the question whether the owner
of the monopoly would prefer to separate management from ownership when he
knows the value of the marginal cost parameter.
4 Should the Owner of a Regulated Monopoly
Leave the Control to a Manager?
Reconsider the regulatory environment introduced in Section 2 with the following
modification. The marginal cost parameter of the monopoly, which remains to be
unknown to the regulator, is now known to the owner of the monopoly (as well as to
the manager if there is any). However, the regulator’s belief as to whether the owner
of the monopoly knows the cost information depends on the existence of a manager.
If the monopoly has no manager, then (we assume) the regulator will believe that
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the marginal cost parameter is privately known to the owner. On the other hand,
if the monopoly employs a manager, then the regulator will believe that the cost
information is privately held by the manager. Given this modified environment, the
owner of the monopoly has to decide whether he should hire, and leave the control
to, a manager before the monopoly is optimally regulated.
Clearly, if the monopoly employs no manager, then the regulatory policy will
elicit the marginal cost information from the monopoly owner. In this case, the
regulated welfare of the monopoly owner with the marginal cost θ will be equal
to that in the BM case, which corresponds to S¯m(θ|k = 1) in our model. On
the other hand, if the monopoly is controlled by a manager, then the regulatory
policy will elicit the marginal cost information from the manager. In that case,
the owner is expected to choose the managerial compensation parameter as
kˆ(θ) = argmaxk∈[0,1]p¯i0(θ) to maximize her net gain. Consequently, the welfare
of the owner will be p¯i0(θ|k = kˆ(θ)). It will be optimal for the owner of the
monopoly to hire a manager (with the compensation parameter kˆ(θ)) if and only if
p¯i∗0(θ|k = k∗(θ)) ≥ S¯m(θ|k = 1).
Proposition 6. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and α ∈ (1/2, 1). Then, under the
regulatory policy (13-(20), the monopoly owner (i) strictly prefers to let the control
to a manager if γ = 0 and the marginal cost of production is sufficiently large, (ii)
strictly prefers to control the monopoly herself if the marginal cost of production is
sufficiently small.
Proof. By the assumptions stated above, the optimal regulatory policy is given by
(13)-(20). First, let γ = 1. Then p¯io(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1].
Now, let γ = 0. If the monopoly is controlled by the owner, then k = 1, otherwise
k = kˆ(θ1) ≡ argmaxk∈[0,1]p¯io(θ). Below, will calculate the net gain of the monopoly
owner at k = 1 and k = kˆ(θ).
First consider the case of θ = θ1. Trivially, S¯m(θ1|k = 1) =
∫ θ1
θ1
r¯(x|k = 1)q¯(x|k =
1)dx = 0. On the other hand, from Proposition 2, kˆ(θ1) ∈ (0, 1), p¯(θ1|kˆ(θ1)) > θ1,
and r¯(θ1|kˆ(θ1)) = 1, implying p¯io(θ1|k = kˆ(θ1)) > 0.
Now, consider the case of θ = θ0. Equations (13)-(15) imply that for all θ ∈
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(θ0, θ1], we have p¯(θ|k = 1) = z¯(θ|k = 1) = θ + (1− α)F (θ)/f(θ), implying q¯(θ|k =
1) = a − z¯(θ|k = 1) > 0 by Assumptions 1 and 2. Moreover, for all θ ∈ (θ0, θ1], we
have r¯(θ|k = 1) = 1 by (17), since Γ¯(θ|k = 1) = (a− z¯(θ))2/2 ≥ 0 by (18). Therefore,
S¯m(θ0|k = 1) =
∫ θ1
θ0
r¯(x|k = 1)q¯(x|k = 1)dx > 0. On the other hand, we have
z¯(θ0|k = kˆ(θ0))− θ0 = (1− α)(1− kˆ(θ0))(θ0 − a)
1− 2(1− α)(1− kˆ(θ0))
< 0, (45)
due to the assumptions that α ∈ (1/2, 1) and θ0 < θ1 < a and the fact that kˆ(θ0) ∈
(0, 1) by Proposition 2. Thus, p¯(θ0) = θ0, implying p¯io(θ0|k = kˆ(θ0)) = 0.
Above, we have established that
p¯io(θ1|k = kˆ(θ1)) > 0, S¯m(θ1|k = 1) = 0
and
p¯io(θ0|k = kˆ(θ0)) = 0, S¯m(θ0|k = 1) > 0.
Because both S¯m(θ|k = 1) and p¯io(θ|k = k∗(θ)) are continuous in θ, we have two
conclusions:
Conclusion 1: When γ = 0, there exists θ¯ ∈ (θ0, θ1) such that for all θ ∈ [θ¯, θ1] we
have p¯io(θ|k = kˆ(θ)) > S¯m(θ|k = 1).
Conclusion 2: Both when γ = 0 and γ = 1, there exists θ˜ ∈ (θ0, θ1) such that for
all θ ∈ [0, θ˜] we have p¯io(θ|k = kˆ(θ)) < S¯m(θ|k = 1).
Obviously, parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition follows from Conclusions 1 and 2,
respectively. 
Interestingly, the above proposition shows that when regulated according to an
incentive-compatible mechanism, the owner of a technologically efficient monopoly
may prefer to possess the control of her company, whereas the owner of a techno-
logically inefficient monopoly may prefer to delegate the control of her company to
a manager, provided that the owner is not taxed by the regulator. However, these
two forms of control cannot be ranked unambiguously in terms of the expected social
welfare.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the problem of regulating a monopoly controlled by a
manager who privately knows the marginal cost of production. The direct revelation
mechanism we have constructed elicits the cost information from the manager instead
of the owner, unlike in the BM model. As the manager is entitled to a fraction of
the profits of the monopoly in the case of no regulation, the amount of rent due to
the private cost information is generally found to be smaller for the manager in our
model than for the owner in the BM model, alleviating the need for suppressing at
each cost level the output, equalling the marginal information rent.
Accordingly, we have found that generally the optimal price is lower and the
optimal output is higher in our model than in the BM model. In addition, if the
compensation parameter chosen by the owner is sufficiently small, the optimal price
recommends marginal cost pricing, provided that the regulator cannot tax the owner
of the monopoly. Moreover, regardless whether the owner of the monopoly has
complete or incomplete information about the marginal cost parameter, it is never
optimal for her to offer an arbitrarily small or large fraction of the profits to the
manager. We have also showed that when the marginal cost of production is suf-
ficiently large, the owner of the monopoly chooses to separate management from
ownership, provided that she is not taxed by the regulator. In contrast, the owner
of the monopoly finds separation undesirable if the marginal cost of production is
sufficiently small.
A possible extension to our model may consider the implications of alternative
forms of managerial compensations on the optimal regulation. For example, like in
Sklivas (1987), the manager may be entitled to a weighted sum of profits and rev-
enues, where the weights to be optimally chosen by the owner. Moreover, extending
the monopoly model to a duopoly, one can obtain a strategic game played between
the owners of the two firms in the market in choosing optimal managerial compen-
sations for their managers. It may be fruitful to investigate how such a game would
affect the regulatory outcome and the social welfare as well as the firms’ decisions to
separate management from ownership.4
4The proposed strategic game was already studied by Sklivas (1987) for a duopolistic market
in a non-regulatory environment. They found that the two firms in the market earn higher profits
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